上市公司财务风险文献综述中英文资料外文翻译文献.doc

1、中英文资料外文翻译文献上市公司财务风险的评价及控制的文献综述中国从资本市场建立开始，上市公司也随之不断地发展，上市的公司从行业、类型到地区、规模都呈现多样化趋势。中国的上市公司，特别是上市公司中的ST公司，存在着严重的财务风险问题，财务风险比较大，对上市公司的发展会有很大的影响。因此对上市公司财务风险问题的研究是十分重要的。通过对这一领域大量文献的研究，从企业财务风险的成因、评价体系及控制三个角度综述，加强分析，以期对上市公司财务风险的理论和实践研究提供借鉴和指导。（一） 国外研究综述西方古典经济学家在十九世纪就已经提出了风险的概念，认为风险是经营活动的副产品，经营者的收入是其在经营活动中承担

2、风险的报酬。从狭义上看，企业的财务风险是指由于利用负债给企业带来的破产风险或普通股收益发生大幅度变动的风险。这种观点立足于企业筹资时过多举债或举债不当。西方国家强调全面风险管理的观念是从资金运动到资本经营整个体系的过程，对财务风险的控制包括风险预警、风险识别、危机处理等内容。美国经济学家富兰克.H.奈特(Frank H.Knight)在1921年出版的(Risk， Uncertainty and Profit)一书中认为：风险是指“可度量的不确定性”。而“不确定性”是指不可度量的风险。风险的特征是概率估计的可靠性，概率估计的可靠性来自所遵循的理论规律或稳定的经验规律。与可计算或可预见的风险不同

3、，不确定性是指人们缺乏对事件的基本知识，对事件可能的结果知之甚少，因此，不能通过现有理论或经验进行预见和定量分析 美 Frank H.Knight,王宇，王文玉译.风险、不确定性和利润M中国人民大学出版社2005；。 此段原文如下：“The debt finacing increases the risks borne by the stockholders. The extra risk that arises from the use of debt finacing is called the financial risk of the firm equity. In other wor

4、d,financial risk is the equity risk that comes from the financial policy(i.e. capital structure) of the f1rm.”Ross,Westerfield,Jordan,Fundamentals of Corporate Finance,1995Ross, Westerfield, Jordan(1995)在Fundamentals of Corporate Finance提到债务筹资会增加股东的风险，使用债务筹资所产生的这部分额外风险称为公司股东的财务风险。也就是说，财务风险是指由于公司财务政策

5、(如资本结构)所产生的权益风险。 此段原文如下：“Broadly speaking,financial risk encompasses both the risk of possible insolvency and the added variability in earnings per share that is induced byt he use of financial leverage.” James C.Van Horne,John M. Wachowicz Jr,Fundamental of Financial Management,2001James C. Van Hor

6、n, John M. Wachowicz Jr(2001)在Fundamental of Financial Management里面更宽泛地说明了财务风险包括可能丧失偿债能力的风险，以及由于使用财务杠杆而导致的每股收益变动。美国学者小阿瑟威廉姆斯（C.Arthur Willianms)和理查德M.汉斯（Richard M.Heins)在1985年合著的Risk Management and Insurance中将风险定义为：“在给定情况和特定时间内，那些可能发生的结果间的差异。如果肯定只有一个结果发生，则差异为零，风险为零；如果有多种可能结果，则有风险，且差异越大，风险越大。”小阿瑟威廉姆斯

7、等著，陈伟等译风险管理与保险M中国商业出版社1990：4；这种观点强调，风险是客观存在的事物，可以从客观角度来衡量。在财务控制方面，国外学者的研究有：美国数学家诺伯特维纳1948年创立的控制论；1932年FitzPatrick开展的一元判定研究；Altman在1968年首先创立的zeta模型等。总体看来，国外财务风险研究起步早，理论体系完善，应用领域广，且研究成果多且系统。如，国外的多家风险管理协会、风险管理学院对企业风险管理事务、专业证书考试制度极具贡献，其中，美国全球风险专业人员协会每年举办财务风险管理人员专业证书考试，多家协会和学会出版风险管理方面的刊物杂志，还出版较多的财务性风险管理书

8、籍等。（二） 国内研究综述1989年北京商学院的刘恩禄、汤谷良发表的“论财务风险管理”7，第一次全面论述了财务风险的定义、特性及财务风险管理的步骤和方法。财政科学研究所的向德伟博士在1994年发表了“论财务风险”8，全面而细致地分析了财务风险产生的原因，认为“财务风险是一种微观风险，是企业经营风险的集中体现”，“企业财务风险，按照财务活动的基本内容来划分，包括筹资风险、投资风险、资金回收风险和收益分配风险四项”，为更深一层推进财务风险理论奠定了基础。唐晓云在2000年发表了“略论企业财务风险管理”9，认为企业财务风险是指在各项财务活动中，由于各种难以预料或控制的因素的影响，财务状况具有不确定性

9、，从而使企业蒙受损失的可能性。她进一步将财务风险分为筹资风险、投资风险、现金流量风险和外汇风险四种。以上观点虽然对财务风险的分类不同，但都认为，企业财务风险是因企业财务活动中各种不确定因素的影响，使企业财务收益与预期收益发生偏离，因而造成蒙受损失的机会和可能。企业财务活动的组织和管理过程中的某一方面和某个环节的问题，都可能促使这种风险转变为损失，导致企业盈利能力和偿债能力的降低。这种观点是一种广义观。胡华在2004年发表了“现代企业财务风险的原因及防范”10，认为财务风险的成因是由以下五点构成的：1 负债经营是财务风险产生最为根本的原因。2 企业资产流动性弱、现金流量短缺，是财务风险产生的最为

10、直接的原因。3 企业经营不善、投资失误是导致财务风险产生、财务状况恶化最为重要的催化剂。4 企业资本结构不合理是财务风险产生、财务危机出现最为综合的因素。5 外部环境的多变性是企业财务风险产生的重要外因。2009年，王宏发表了“浅谈公司财务风险的成因及防范”11，认为造成财务风险原因的是以下四个方面：1 企业财务管理的宏观环境复杂多变,而企业管理系统不能适应复杂多变的宏观环境2 企业财务管理人员对财务风险的客观性认识不足3 财务决策缺乏科学性导致决策失误4 企业内部财务关系不明根据我国学者们的观点不难推出，分析企业财务风险的成因离不开企业的内外部环境因素的影响，所以本文也将从上市公司的内外部环

11、境来分析财务风险发生的原因。易晓文（1999）发表了“上市公司财务评价指标体系研究”12，作者在文章中对公司财务评价指标体系的内容及指标的选取进行了初步分析、研究。桂文林,舒晓惠,伍超标（2005）发表了“上市公司财务评价历史分析和展望”13，以上市公司财务评价现实意义为前提, 系统地分析了上市公司财务评价指标体系的构建、各种评价方法的比较以及实证研究三项主要内容。并在此基础上, 为进一步发展上市公司财务评价的实证研究提供新的思路。2009年西北大学的孙金莉发表了“基于企业现金流量的财务预警指标体系研究”14，在认真研究了建立企业现金流量财务预警系统的原则和程序，以及建立健全企业现金流量财务预

12、警机制的基础上，构建了企业现金流量财务预警系统。李季在2010年发表了“上市公司财务危机预警指标研究”15，作者认为目前为止国外已开发出若干财务危机评价模型,有的模型在信贷风险评价与管理企业资信评估等实务中已得到广泛应用。而我国对财务危机预警指标仍使用传统的经验范式,因而探索我国企业财务危机预警指标体系对我国经济体制改革深化具有较强理论意义与较紧迫的现实意义。景红华（2010）发表了“财务困境研究应基于现金流量指标”16，认为现金是企业赖以生存的基础，现金流量是企业财务的报警器，企业的生存和发展在很大程度上取决于现金，因此，财务困境研究应基于现金流量指标。通过阅读大量关于企业财务风险评价体系的

13、相关资料的，了解到，要知道企业财务风险状况如何，必须从偿债能力指标、营运能力指标、盈利能力指标及现金流量风险指标方面来研究。童宏宾在2004年发表了“企业财务风险成因及控制”17，简单地从规避风险、转移风险和提高企业的盈利能力三个方面来对上市公司的财务风险作出控制。王海翔（2005）发表了“论企业财务风险及其控制”18，较全面地从MM理论和期权理论来研究企业财务风险的控制。吴景杰、施绍梅（2005）发表了“财务风险的控制”19，认为在运用理论方法进行财务风险分析时,需要管理人员对具体环境、方法的切合性及某些条件进行合理假设和估计。另外，在采取防范和规避风险的对策时，也必须以规范、科学的管理为基

14、础，否则因使用对策不当反而有可能招致更大的风险。2009年盛九春和叶波二人发表了“现代企业财务风险的防范和控制”20，总结了三点防范与控制的措施：1 完善财务管理系统，提高财务决策的科学化水平2 强化财务风险防范意识，树立正确的财务风险观念3 建立健全企业财务风险识别与预警系统孔远英（2010）发表了“关于企业财务风险控制的几点建议”21，认为企业发生财务危机是一个逐步显现、缓慢恶化的过程，它的发生具有一定的先兆，因此具有可预测性。为了规避和防范财务风险，企业有必要对财务风险进行充分的认识和分析，及时纠正、改进、并制定相应的对策，有效地完善财务风险预警机制。我国学者对于财务风险控制问题的解决几

15、乎都离不开规避和防范，观点不一，本本文会在此基础上提出中国上市公司财务风险控制存在的问题及提出对研究有价值的策略。三、 评述与启示东南亚金融危机以来，国家安全己成为各国关注的焦点之一。国家经济安全必须从防范金融危机、财政危机着手，这已为人们所重视，但人们常忽略金融危机与财政危机的基础是财务危机。财务危机主要表现为公司资本循环周转被打乱而导致的支付危机，它常常潜伏于财务风险之中12。资本市场的繁荣为企业实现跨越式发展提供了无限可能。大型上市公司舞弊的丑闻尚未消散，次贷危机引发的金融海啸又席卷了全球。而此前的短短几年间，我国资本市场迎来了空前繁荣，众多上市公司增发新股，许多尚不具备上市条件的公司也

16、在积极整改包装上市。尽管股市是否出现明显泡沫尚存在争议，但是没有健康的盈利增长，这种繁荣是难以维系的。谋求资本市场的长远发展必须从上市公司的财务风险着手。有效的控制财务风险可以均衡各方利益，规范上市公司行为，使其健康有序的运行。学者们的研究提高了我们对企业财务风险的重视，并且更有助于我们开拓企业财务风险控制的新思路、新方法，使其在我国企业中得以更好地运用。因狭义的观点明显片面地理解力财务风险，所以，本文将采用广义的财务风险观点，它符合人们对财务概念的理解，便于从更宽广的角度来研究财务风险。希望借鉴国内外先进理论，通过对上市公司财务风险的基本分析, 采用一定的方法, 对财务风险加以控制,以达到企

17、业利益最优的目的。参考文献：1Shyam,Sunder.Theory Accounting and ControlJ.An Innternational Theory on PublishingComPany.1997;2Ogryezak,W,Ruszeznski,A. Rom Stomchastic Dominance to Mean-Risk Models:Semide-Viations as Risk MeasuresJ.European Journal of Operational Research.1999;3 Borowski, D.M., and P.J. Elmer. An E

18、xpert System Approach to Financial Analysis: the Case of S&L Bankruptcy J.Financial Management, Autumn.2004;4 Casey, C.and N. Bartczak. Using Operating Cash Flow Data to Predict Financial Distress: Some ExtensionsJ. Journal of Accounting Research,Spring.2005;5 John M.Mulvey,HafizeGErkan.Applying CVa

19、R for decentralized risk management of financial companiesJ.Journal of Banking&Finanee.2006;6 Altman. Credit Rating:Methodologies,Rationale and Default RiskMRisk Books,London. 2002;7 刘恩禄，汤谷良论财务风险管理N北京商学院学报1989(01)；8 向德伟论财务风险J会计研究1994(4)；9 唐晓云略论企业财务风险管理J.上海会计2000(2)；10 胡华现代企业财务风险的原因及防范J会计之友2004(1)52-

20、53；11 王宏浅谈公司财务风险的成因及防范J内蒙古科技与经济2009(4)33-34；12 易晓文上市公司财务评价指标体系研究N温州大学学报1999(3)；13 桂文林，舒晓惠，伍超标上市公司财务评价历史分析和展望J工业技术济2005(02)；14 孙金莉基于企业现金流量的财务预警指标体系研究D西北大学2009；15 李季上市公司财务危机预警指标研究J企业家天地(理论版)2010(09)；16 景红华财务困境研究应基于现金流量指标J新财经(理论版)2010(10)；17 童宏兵企业财务风险成因及控制J财务与审计2004(7)61；18 王海翔论企业财务风险及其控制D首都经济贸易大学20051

21、3-24；19 吴景杰，施绍梅财务风险的控制J理财杂志2005(06)32-33；20 盛九春，叶波现代企业财务风险的防范和控制J财经管理2009(4)203；21 孔远英关于企业财务风险控制的几点建议J海峡科学2010(03)；外文资料 Financial rm bankruptcy and systemic riskIn Fall 2008 when the Federal Reserve and the Treasury injected $85 billion into the insurance behemoth American International Group (AIG),

22、 themoney lent to AIGwent straight to counterparties, and very few funds remained with the insurer. Among the largest recipients was Goldman Sachs, to whomabout $12 billionwas paid to undoAIGs credit default swaps (CDSs). The bailout plan focused on repaying the debt by slowly selling off AIGs asset

23、s, with no intention of maintaining jobs or allowing the CDSmarket to continue to function as before. Thus, the governments effort to avoid systemic risk with AIG was mainly about ensuring that rms with which AIG had done business did not fail as a result. The concerns are obviously greatest vis-a-v

24、is CDSs, ofwhich AIG had over $400 billion contracts outstanding in June 2008.In contrast, the government was much less enthusiastic about aiding General Motors, presumably because they believed its failure would not cause major macroeconomic repercussions by imposing losses on related rms. This dec

25、ision is consistent with the view in macroeconomic research that financialrmbankruptcies pose a greater amount of systemic risk than nonfinancial firmbankruptcies. For example, Bordo and Haubrich (2009) conclude that “.more severe nancial events are associated withmore severe recessions.” Likewise,

26、Bernanke (1983) argues the Great Depressionwas so severe because ofweakness in the banking systemthat affected the amount of credit available for investment. Bernanke et al. (1999) hypothesize a financial accelerator mechanism, whereby distress in one sector of the economy leads to more precarious b

27、alance sheets and tighter credit conditions. This in turn leads to a drop in investment, which is followed by less lending and a widespread downturn. Were shocks to the economy always to come in the form of distress at nonnancial rms, these authors argue that the business downturns would not be so s

28、evere.We argue instead that the contagious impact of a nonfinancial firms bankruptcy is expected to be far larger than that of a financial rm like AIG, although neither would be catastrophic to the U.S. economy through counterparty risk channels. This is not to say that an episode ofwidespread finan

29、cial distress among our largest banks would not be followed by an especially severe recession, only that such failures would not cause a recession or affect the depth of a recession. Rather such bankruptcies are symptomatic of common factors in portfolios that lead to wealth losses regardless of whe

30、ther any firm les for bankruptcy.Pervasive nancial fragility may occur because the failure of one rm leads to the failure of other rms which cascades through the system (e.g., Davis and Lo, 1999; Jarrow and Yu, 2001). Or systemic risk may wreak havoc when a number of nancial rms fail simultaneously,

31、 as in the Great Depression when more than 9000 banks failed (Benston, 1986). In the former case, the failure of one rm, such as AIG, Lehman Brothers or Bear Stearns, could lead to widespread failure through nancial contracts such as CDSs. In the latter case, the fact that so many nancial institutio

32、ns have failed means that both the money supply and the amount of credit in the economy could fall so far as to cause a large drop in economic activity (Friedman and Schwartz, 1971).While a weak nancial systemcould cause a recession, the recession would not arise because one rm was allowed to le ban

33、kruptcy. Further, should one or the other rmgo bankrupt, the nonnancial rmwould have the greater impact on the economy.Such extreme real effects that appear to be the result of nancial rm fragility have led to a large emphasis on the prevention of systemic risk problems by regulators. Foremost among

34、 these policies is “too big to fail” (TBTF), the logic of which is that the failure of a large nancial institution will have ramifications for other nancial institutions and therefore the risk to the economywould be enormous. TBTF was behind the Feds decisions to orchestrate the merger of Bear Stear

35、ns and J.P. Morgan Chase in 2008, its leadership in the restructuring of bank loans owed by Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), and its decision to prop up AIG. TBTF may be justied if the outcome is prevention of a major downswing in the economy. However, if the systemic risks in these episodes hav

36、e been exaggerated or the salutary effects of these actions overestimated, then the cost to the efciency of the capital allocation system may far outweigh any potential benets from attempting to avoid another Great Depression.No doubt, no regulator wants to take the chance of standing down while wat

37、ching over another systemic risk crisis, sowe do not have the ability to examine empiricallywhat happens to the economy when regulators back off. There are very fewinstances in themodern history of the U.S.where regulators allowed the bankruptcy of amajor nancial rm.Most recently,we can point to the

38、 bankruptcy of Lehman,which the Fed pointedly allowed to fail.However,with only one obvious casewhere TBTFwas abandoned, we have only an inkling of how TBTF policy affects systemic risk. Moreover, at the same time that Lehman failed, the Fed was intervening in the commercial paper market and aiding

39、money marketmutual fundswhile AIGwas downgraded and subsequently bailed out. In addition, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury were scaremongering about the prospects of a second Great Depression to make the passage of TARPmore likely. Thuswewill never knowif themarket downturn that followed the Leh

40、man bankruptcy reected fear of contagion from Lehman to the real economy or fear of the depths of existing problems in the real economy that were highlighted so dramatically by regulators.In this paper we analyze the mechanisms by which such risk could cause an economy-wide col-lapse.We focus on two

41、 types of contagion that might lead to systemic risk problems: (1) information contagion,where the information that one nancial rmis troubled is associatedwith negative shocksat other nancial institutions largely because the rms share common risk factors; or (2) counterparty contagion,where one impo

42、rtant nancial institutions collapse leads directly to troubles at other cred-itor rms whose troubles snowball and drive other rms into distress. The efcacy of TBTF policies depends crucially on which of these two types of systemic riskmechanisms dominates.Counterparty contagion may warrant intervent

43、ion in individual bank failureswhile information contagion does not.If regulators do not step in to bail out an individual rm, the alternative is to let it fail. In the case of a bank, the process involves the FDIC as receiver and the insured liabilities of the rmare very quickly repaid. In contrast

44、, the failure of an investment bank or hedge fund does not involve the FDIC andmay closely resemble a Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 ling of a nonnancial rm. However, if the nonbank nancial rm in question has liabilities that are covered by the Securities Industry Protection Corporation (SIPC), the rmis re

45、quired by lawunder the Securities Industry Protection Act (SIPA) to liquidate under Chapter 7 (Don and Wang, 1990). This explains in large partwhy only the holding company of Lehman led for bankruptcy in 2008 and its brokerdealer subsidiaries were not part of the Chapter 11 ling.A major fear of a na

46、ncial rm liquidation, whether done through the FDIC or as required by SIPA, is that re sales will depress recoveries for the creditors of the failed nancial rm and that these re saleswill have ramications for other rms in related businesses, even if these businesses do not have direct ties to the fa

47、iled rm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). This fear was behind the Feds decision to extend liquidity to primary dealers inMarch 2008 Fed Chairman Bernanke explained in a speech on nancial system stability that“the risk developed that liquidity pressuresmight force dealers to sell assets into already illi

48、quid markets. Thismight have resulted in.a re sale scenario., inwhich a cascade of failures andliquidations sharply depresses asset prices, with adverse nancial and economic implications.”(May 13, 2008 speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta conference at Sea Island, Georgia)The fear of potential re sales is expressed in further