1、一、 外文原文Chinese states economic cooperation Related investment:An investigation of its direction and some Implications for outward investmentBy: Sumon Bhaumik and Catherine Yap CoSumon Kumar Bhaumik*Brunel University,William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, andIZA Institute for
2、the Study of Labour, BonnEmail: Sumon.Bhaumikbrunel.ac.ukCatherine Yap Co*University of Nebraska at OmahaEmail: ccomail.unomaha.eduAbstractThe Chinese state undertakes large scale investments in a number of countries under the auspices of economic cooperation related investment (ECI). While there ar
3、e suggestions that it is an extension of Chinas soft power aimed at facilitating Chinese FDI in those countries, often for access to natural resources, there is no systematic analysis of this in the literature. In this paper, we examine this investment of the Chinese state over time. Our results sug
4、gest that the pattern of investment is indeed explained well by factors that are used in the stylized literature to explain directional patterns of outward FDI. They also demonstrate that the (positive) relationship between Chinese ECI and the recipient countries natural resource richness is not eco
5、nomically meaningful. Finally, while there is some support for the popular wisdom that Chinas willingness to do business with a country is not strongly affected by its level of corruption, there is much weaker support, if any, for the hypotheses that China favors doing business with countries where
6、political rights are limited.Running title: Chinas economic cooperation related investmentsKeywords: China; Economic cooperation related investment; Foreign direct investment; Natural resources; Institutional qualityIntroduction2011, Risks in Global MarketThe risks in the global market have been cha
7、nging rapidly. The theme of the world economy in 2010 is not so much “recovery” as “adjustment”. Shocked by the global financial crisis, economies began to question and reconstruct the game rules of the global business. This trend may continue and even deepen in 2011. Although the impact of the fina
8、ncial woes may clear away in this year, it is hard for the global economy to go steadily up. The side effects of the crisis are far from negligible and may lead to more uncertainties in some areas, such as Europe and Africa.This report provides a guide to cope with the risks and manipulate the marke
9、ts. Zhou Mi, an expert from the Ministry of Commerce of China makes an overview on the risks of investing and doing business in the global market and specifies those in major economies. He argues that the advanced economies will keep fighting for their frustrated financial systems in 2011 and their
10、markets will revive unsteadily. Some developing economies may be the gold mines in the global market in 2011, but risks still exist, apparently or potentially. Exporters and investors will have to shun or tackle these risks so that they can benefit from these markets. A senior manager from Ernst & Y
11、oung also clarified the changes of customs policies in 2010, especially the revision of the incoterms . Along with the policy environment analysis by an expert from the Chinese Economic Diplomacy, these will help Chinese investors and exporters to adapt to the shifting rules.Until recently, the beha
12、vior and strategies of multinational enterprises (MNEs) was viewed largely through the prism of the ownership-location-internalization (OLI) paradigm (Dunning, 1988). An MNE was believed to be an entity that has ownership of some special capability (e.g., technology) that it can leverage by gaining
13、access to a resource available in another country or to an overseas market. However, rather than import the resource or export to the overseas market, the MNE might choose to internalize the process of accessing this resource or market by setting up an operation in that overseas location, because th
14、e expected profits from such internalization is higher. There is an extensive literature on both the determinants of the choice between actual market entry and alternatives like franchising, as well as the determinants of alternative entry modes like greenfield projects, cross-border acquisitions an
15、d joint ventures (JV) (see Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik and Peng, 2009, and the references therein)The recent surge of FDI from emerging markets,2 and the consequent rise in interest about the emerging market MNEs (EMNEs), suggests that these entities do not conform to the traditional view of MNEs. Indeed
16、, in most cases, these firms do not possess capabilities similar to developed country MNEs and that, indeed, overseas expansion is often a means to acquire such capabilities. The high profile acquisitions of IBM personal computer business by Lenovo of China and the Jaguar-Land Rover brands by Tata M
17、otors of India are examples of this pursuit of capabilities. At the same time, these emerging market firms have certain characteristics that manifest their successful survival in contexts with missing institutions and markets, but those that might be detrimental for successful overseas expansion. Fo
18、r example, it is now well understood that family ownership and formation of business groups in emerging markets are an optimal response to an environment of weak contract enforcement and missing (or imperfect) capital markets, respectively (Bhaumik and Gregoriou, 2009). But, as recent research sugge
19、sts, family control or business group affiliation discourages overseas investment on account of factors such as weak corporate governance in such firms and reluctance to bear the cost of altering the style of management in an alien environment about which the emerging market firm has little informat
20、ion (see Bhaumik, Driffield and Pal, 2010, and the references therein).In this paper, we address this lacuna in the literature, by attempting to reconcile a states in this case Chinas projection of soft power with factors that usually determine the extent and direction of outward FDI from emerging m
21、arkets. The choice of China as focus of our analysis is interesting on two counts. First, there is a conjecture that the Chinese state facilitates outward FDI of Chinese MNEs, by providing crucial linkages with destination countries (Buckley et al., 2008). Further, a noticeable proportion of the ove
22、rseas ventures of Chinese firms has been in resource-rich developing countries where resources are de jure or de facto under government control and not easily accessible through market transactions. Our proxy for the projection of soft power is economic cooperation related investment by the Chinese
23、state in other countries. We find that the amount and direction of this investment can be well explained by factors that are used in the stylized literature to explain overseas FDI of firms. We, therefore, conclude that there is prima facie evidence that the Chinese state uses economic cooperation a
24、s a tool to facilitate overseas FDI of the Chinese MNEs (CMNEs).the Chinese State and Outward InvestmentIt is generally agreed that CMNEs enjoy certain firm-specific advantages that they can leverage as they expand their operations overseas. They are able to access capital at a cost that is lower th
25、an their global rivals. In part, this is on account of access to cheap credit offered by the Chinese state-owned banks or, in the case of state-owned firms, by the state itself (Antkiewicz and Whalley, 2006; Lardy, 1998; Warner, Hong and Xu, 2004). Access to inexpensive capital can also be the outco
26、me of internal capital markets operated by Chinese conglomerates (Tsai, 2002). CMNEs are also able to leverage their relationships with the Chinese diaspora in the countries in which they invest, reducing the risk associated with such investment (Lecraw, 1977; Zhan, 1995).During the early years of t
27、he reform process, Chinese overseas investments were dominated by large state-owned companies, and key investment decisions, including location of overseas operations, were dictated by political considerations (Hong and Sun, 2006). For example, the decision to invest in Hong Kong s infrastructure wa
28、s aimed at enhancing Chinese influence in what was, at that time, British territory on which China had a claim. By 1992, the ideological debate about the direction of China s reform had been resolved, and encouragement of overseas investment by Chinese firms became an established part of the states
29、long term strategy. Overseas investment emerged as a tool to gain access to both technology and natural resources. High profile examples of such investments include those made in Indonesian and Algerian oil fields, South African mines, the Brazilian steel industry and the US technology sector. Outwa
30、rd FDI was also aimed at providing Chinese companies access to overseas markets and international brands. Haier, for example, invested in production facilities in the United States to bypass quotas and anti-dumping measures, while TCL gained access to the Thomson and Alcatel brands. The 1992-98 peri
31、od witnessed a cautious implementation of this strategy to go global, but the strategy has been pursued vigorously since 1999. There is a growing literature on the strategic aspects of the trans nationalization process of CMNEs (Sauvant, 2005; Zhang, 2005).The determinants of the direction of Chines
32、e outward FDI itself have been examined.Buckley et al. (2007) have demonstrated that, in keeping with expectations, outward FDI from China is positively associated with the size of the host market, its cultural proximity to China, and its openness to FDI. Their results are also consistent with the p
33、opular perception about the natural resource-seeking nature of Chinese outward FDI (see Deng, 2003). However, contrary to expectations, FDI is also positively correlated with a countrys political risk. They explain this anomaly by alluding to the low cost of capital for CMNEs, especially those in th
34、e public sector, and the apparent lack of sophistication of risk evaluation processes of these companies.As mentioned earlier, in this paper, we examine an activity of the Chinese state that arguably captures that strategic dimension, namely, its overseas investments related to economic cooperation.
35、 In 2006, turnover from such economic cooperation activities was close to US$ 35.7 billion, twice the magnitude of Chinas net outward FDI of US$ 17.6 billion. A large proportion of this investment is aimed at building infrastructure in the recipient countries, especially in developing countries. In
36、late 2004, for example, Chinese contractors built office buildings in Luanda and repaired Angolas railway system that was mostly destroyed during the countrys 27-year long civil war (Walt, 2006). In Iran, such investment has been used to develop transport-related infrastructure and dams (Walt, 2005)
37、.6 In both countries, soon after the initiation of “economic cooperation”, Chinese oil and gas companies, who are at the forefront of Chinese outward FDI, received licenses to operate large oil fields. While any causality between the economic cooperation and the aforementioned license cannot be esta
38、blished without further evidence, it is easy to see that there is evidence of at least correlation between Chinas economic cooperation related investment on both subsequent outward FDI of Chinese companies and on their access to resources that are of national importance to other countries. In the re
39、st of the paper, we examine this link more closely.Data and Empirical StrategyThe data on Chinas economic cooperation related investment the dependent variable in our regression model are obtained from various editions of China Statistical Yearbook. These are annual flows of such investment measured
40、 in (millions of) US dollars. Information provided in the Yearbooks suggests that much of the investment was used to finance projects such as construction of dams, roads and railways. The data for the explanatory variables in equation (2) are collected from a number of sources. Data on GDP and per c
41、apita GDP, measured in constant 2000 international dollars, are obtained from the 2005 version of the World Development Indicators that are released annually by the World Bank. Data on bilateral trade between China and each of the recipient countries are obtained from the aforementioned Yearbooks. S
42、ince data for developing countries destination for a significant proportion of Chinese economic cooperation related investment are not always available for all the years, we have sometimes had to substitute missing values with available values of the corresponding variables going back one or two yea
43、rs. For example, if data for energy exports for 2000 are not available for a country, we have substituted it with the energy export data for 1999 or, if data for 1999 are unavailable as well, with data for 1998. When working with developing country data, such imputation of value of missing values is
44、 not uncommon in the literature (see Meyer et al. 2009), and helps minimize loss of observations on account of missing data. Imputation is mostly done for fuel and mineral exports, and no more than 6% of these data are imputed in the 1998-2000 and 2001-2003 periods. However, availability of these da
45、ta in 2003 is comparatively low so the extent of imputation for 2004-2006 is higher at 17% for fuels and 14% for minerals. Importantly, a comparison of the 2003 data with the 2001 and 2002 data show that the latter are within 3 percentage points of the 2003 value for about 90% of all countries with
46、comparable data for these years. Hence, we conclude that the exercise involving imputation could not have affected our estimation significantly.The distributions of the natural log of ECI (LECI) for the three periods appear in Figure 1. indicative of an increase in Chinese economic cooperation inves
47、tment across countries over time. Before reporting the full descriptive statistics for and the correlation among ECI and its repressors, we also highlight the relationship between ECI and some recipient country characteristics that have been the source of many discussions in popular discourses about
48、 Chinese overseas investment. In Figure 2, we report the relationship between ECI and the natural resource richness of the recipient countries, as captured by the shares of energy (FUEL) and non- energy minerals (MINERAL) in their exports. In Figure 3, we report the relationship between ECI and the
49、institutional quality of and the political freedom in the recipient countries. Figure 2 suggests that if one considers only countries that are rich in natural resources, with energy or non-energy minerals accounting for more than 30% of their exports, a mild positive relationship may be observed between ECI and natural resource richness of the recipient countries. Overall, if one ignores the outliers in the top right and bottom left quadrants of the scatter diagrams; there is little sign of any
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