1、外文题目： A Customer View on the Most Preferred Alliance Structure between Banks and Insurance Structure 原 文：OverviewIn this paper, we have studied alternative alliance structures between banks and insurance companies from the point of view of Finnish customer representatives. Seven criteria were introd
2、uced for the evaluation of six alternative structure models for such alliances. The evaluation was carried out by an expert panel consisting of customer representatives. As a supporting tool, we used the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP).The alliance models based on plain cross-selling agreements wer
3、e considered most preferred.We also studied how familiar the customer representatives were with the alliance problem from the point of view of the bank and insurance executives and that of the supervisory authorities. We observed that the customer representatives did not recognize the problem as wel
4、l from the point of view of the supervisors as that of the executives. In addition,it was interesting to note that the customer representatives did not consider a risk aspect in the control by ownership alternatives as critical as the executives.Comparing the results in this study to our previous st
5、udies, we may conclude that the best compromise model from all three points of view could be the financial conglomerate on the condition that certain supervisory and customer criteria are satisfied to a sufficient degree.A. IntroductionAlliance formation in the financial industry has been a growing
6、trend during the last decade.Insurers in an alliance between banks and insurance companies are most often life insurance companies, but also non-life companies can be found. Financial alliances often include units like mutual fund managing companies, asset management companies, securities brokerages
7、 and corporate finance companies. In most European countries, banks are allowed to be “universal”. It is customary that they include the above mentioned functions. The same holds more and more often for insurance companies as well (see, eg. Skipper 2000).Thats why the various types of alliances on t
8、he retail market between banks and insurance companies are of special interest.In our previous papers (Voutilainen 2005, Korhonen and Voutilainen 2005 and Korhonen, Koskinen, and Voutilainen 2005), we have studied alliance structure alternatives from different perspectives. In Voutilainen 2005, we i
9、ntroduced six different alliance structure alternatives and nine criteria relevant for evaluating those alternatives from the perspective of the executives of the banks and insurance companies. The alternatives and the criteria were introduced together with bank and insurance experts. Each expert wa
10、s interviewed individually. The experts were representatives of the top management of Finnish banks and insurance companies.In the second paper (Korhonen and Voutilainen 2005), the same group of experts were used as a panel to find the most preferred model for a financial alliance. As a decision sup
11、port system we used the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) developed by Saaty 1980.The problem was a typical AHP-problem: few alternatives and few qualitative criteria.The use of the AHP focused the discussions on the relevant aspects of the choice problem.The final solution was found in two meetings.
12、 The second meeting was the initiative of the panel. The panel felt that the problem required more considerations. The panel preferred the Control by ownership models. On the other hand, a risk-averse manager might also prefer looser alliance alternatives.In the third paper (Korhonen et al. 2005), o
13、ur aim was to find the best financial alliance compromise structure between the executives of the banks and insurance companies and the bank and insurance supervisory authorities in Finland.1 First, we searched for the best alliance structure from the point of view of supervisory authorities. Togeth
14、er with leaders and experts of the supervisory authorities, we introduced eight criteria for the evaluation of the previously defined six alternative alliance structures. The evaluation was carried out by an expert panel consisting of the representatives of the supervisory authorities.The alliance a
15、lternatives based on plain cross-selling agreements received the highest ranks in the evaluation of supervisory authorities. Under certain conditions, the financial conglomerate might be an acceptable compromise alternative for the supervisory authorities as well.In this paper, we have approached ou
16、r problem from the point of view of customers.The importance of this perspective has been emphazised by e.g. Belth 2000. Customer perspective to mergers is taken in Bank Marketing International 2004. We did not take a sample from the population of customers, because most customers are not familiar w
17、ith the problem at all. We were interested in the opinions of “advanced or well informed” customers.To represent those customers, we used leaders and experts of Finnish customerorganizations and labour market organizations (see, Acknowledgements at the end of the paper). As before, each customer rep
18、resentative was interviewed individually. Based on the interviews, we initially introduced seven relevant criteria. The final evaluation was carried out with four criteria. In the evaluation meeting, three out of those seven criteria turned out to be insignificant.We have also studied how well the c
19、ustomer representatives know the alliance problem from the point of view of the bank and insurance executives and that of the supervisory authorities. We asked them to play the role of executives and supervisory authorities and to make the evaluations by using their most important criteria. We also
20、asked them which they would think were the most important executive and supervisory criteria. This provided us with interesting information about the knowledge of the problem of the customer representatives from the perspectives of the other parties. The analysis revealed us which aspects are not ye
21、t well known to the customer representatives. Finally, we compare the prioritizations of all three decision maker groups considered in this and the earlier papers.The paper is organized as follows. Section B. reviews our main previous results. In Section C., we provide a brief introduction to the th
22、eory of the AHP. The decision criteria from the customer point of view are given in Section D., and in Section E., the results are given and discussed. In Section F., we present the results obtained when asking the experts to assume the roles of executives and supervisors. In section G., we compare
23、the criteria and the prioritizations of all three decision maker groups. Finally, in Section H., we conclude the paper with general remarks.B. Review of our earlier research on alliance structuresSince this paper is founded on our earlier research on alliance structures, we summarize here our key re
24、sults.I. Structuring the problemVoutilainen 2005 studied alliances between banks and insurance companies. His perspective was that of the top management of a financial enterprise in the retail market.Alliance structures were classified into three main categories depending on the degree of co-operati
25、on of the partners. These categories were derived together with representatives of the executive management of Finnish banks and insurance companies. The categories in the increasing order of closeness of the partners were Cross-selling agreements. The parties agree to sell each others products to t
26、heir own customers. The cross-selling is frequently one-sided. Most often a bank sells an insurance companys products to its customers. In principle, it could be vice versa as well. The alliance category can still be divided into two subcategories depending on whether the parties service channels ar
27、e overlapping or not. Non-overlapping service channels can be achieved, for example, if the parties actively try to organize cross-selling in such a way that there is no competition between the parties.Here a service channel can be a branch office network, but also a contact center, subside etc. Esp
28、ecially in the case of overlapping branch networks one easily faces channel conflict: the alliance members do not co-operate effectively in the fear of losing their customers to the other party and consequently the sales provisions etc. Non-overlapping service channels often means that the other par
29、ty has no service channel at all.Thus the two different sub-models are Cross-selling agreement, no overlapping service channels (abbreviated CSA1) Cross-selling agreement, overlapping service channels (CSA2)Alliance of independent partners. The alliance type is a special case of a cross-selling agre
30、ement where the alliance is tightened by cross-ownership and/or joint ownership in third parties. Cross-ownership means a minority stake of the other partys shares. If the ownership were one-sided, it would probably be a sign of asymmetry and one partys dominance of the alliance. An example of joint
31、 ownership is a mutual fund management company owned jointly by a bank (banks) and an insurance company (insurance companies).One could also think about cross-ownership/joint ownership without a cross-selling agreement, but such a model seldom occurs in practice.The degree of overlapping is also use
32、d to divide this category into two different subgoals: Alliance of independent partners, no overlapping service channels (AIP1) Alliance of independent partners, overlapping service channels (AIP2)Control by ownership. In both the previous models, earnings and costs are divided. The third category m
33、eans the model, where all the control is in the hand of one party: a bank can simply own (a control of) an insurance company or vice versa, or a third party owns the both ones.This category is divided into two sub-models depending on the controller: Control by ownership, when a bank owns an insuranc
34、e company or vice versa (CBO1) Control by ownership (financial conglomerate): a holding company owns one or severalbanks and one or several insurance companies (FC)We can notice that the classification of the different alternatives is based on the closeness of the alliance and the degree of the over
35、lapping of the service channels.Criteria. The alliance models were compared and eventually prioritized according to the following criteria (the choice of the criteria was also based on the management views).1. Product development (maximize efficiency),2. One-door-principle (implement as effectively
36、as possible),3. Earnings logics (avoid conflicts),4. Customer relationship management (maximize efficiency),5. Cost and revenue synergies (maximize),6. Channel conflicts (minimize),7. Required solvency capital (optimize the balance),8. Investor power (maximize),9. Sales management (maximize efficien
37、cy).According to the interviews the overall importance of earnings logics, synergies and channel conflicts was the greatest one.II. Evaluating with management criteriaKorhonen and Voutilainen 2005) studied the above defined six different possible structure models for alliances and the nine criteria.
38、 Searching for the most preferred alliance model is a multiple criteria decision making (MCDM) problem. To solve the problem, the AnalyticHierarchy Process (AHP) was used, see Saaty 1980.The use of the AHP focused the discussions on pairwise comparisons. The panel (the same members as in Voutilainen
39、 2005) was also willing to consider its evaluations in case the inconsistency was too high. The second meeting was the initiative of the panel.The panel members felt that the problem required more considerations.During the second meeting the panel first evaluated critically the original criteria and
40、 revised some of them. The resulting criteria were1. Earnings logics (avoid conflicts),2. Customer relationship management (maximize efficiency),3. Cost and revenue synergies (maximize),4. Channel conflicts (minimize),5. Required solvency capital (optimize the balance),6. Sales management (maximize
41、efficiency),7. Economies of scale (maximize),8. Economies of scope (maximize),9. Risk.The panel preferred the Control by ownership models. Actually, the Financial conglomerate was the most preferred. On the other hand, a risk-averse manager might also prefer Cross-selling agreement with no overlappi
42、ng service channels or even Alliance of independent partners with no overlapping service channels to Financial conglomerate.III. Compromise with supervisorsIn the third paper, Korhonen et al. 2005 broaden the analysis to include the search for the best alliance compromise structure between the execu
43、tives of the banks and insurance companies and the bank and insurance supervisory authorities. First, the alternative alliance structures were studied from the point of view of supervisory authorities. The leaders and experts of the supervisory authorities introduced eight criteria for the evaluatio
44、n of the above presented alternative alliance structures.1. Equality of the member companies of the alliance,2. System risk management,3. Capability of the authorities to supervise the alliance as well as possible,4. Flexibility of the alliance with respect to changes in its environment,5. Optimal f
45、unctioning of insurance and finance markets,6. Synergies brought about by the alliance,7. Sufficiency of capital,8. Dependency of the alliance on the competence of executive management.The ultimate goal was to search for the alternative which bank and insurance supervisory authorities and bank and i
46、nsurance executive management might accept as a solution to the alliance problem. The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) was again used.The loosely connected alliance models Cross-selling agreements received the highest overall priorities largely because they got very high priorities according to the
47、important criteria System risk management and Capability of the authorities to supervise the alliance as well as possible. The control by ownership models were not considered desirable with respect to these criteria.The result differs sharply from the prioritization made above by the bank and insura
48、nce executives. They favoured very clearly the control by ownership models (if the risk factor was not specially emphasized). The executive point of view is in many ways opposite to the supervisory point of view. Also the criteria were different in seven cases out of eight.Business-driven consolidat
49、ion seems to be in conflict with the supervisory interests.Supervisors seem to think that brought synergies do not outweigh the risk that enters into large and complex financial institutions.However, the differences between the priorities of the different alliance models in this study were essentially smaller than in the previous study with the execu
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