外文翻译--中国与东盟自由贸易区：起源和影响.doc

1、浙江师范大学行知学院本科毕业论文外文翻译译文：中国与东盟自由贸易区：起源和影响摘要：亚太地区的全球化生动地揭示了其在1997-1998年的金融危机。东盟国家认为在危机期间美国和亚太经合组织对其不进行帮助,他们还发现了国际货币基金组织提出的附加条件。但是东盟作为一个地区组织已经大大地被削弱了，它一直在努力重振其影响力。“东盟+ 3”的方法已经被视为一个重要手段,旨在加强东盟的地位和相关性。中国-东盟自由贸易区无疑是这种方法的一个杰出的成就,但东盟一直在努力保持其选择的开放性。另一方面,中国一直关注着中美关系的恶化程度,这在一定程度上增加东京和北京之间的不信任。调整中国的区域政策改善了中国与东盟关

2、系，加强相互利益和相互依存的最好方法是削弱东盟国家所感知的“中国威胁”论。但中国不应忽视了日本和韩国的利益或低估了东盟的电阻来排除美国和其希望维持在该地区的力量平衡。中国-东盟自由贸易区还应该促进发达和发展中东盟成员国之间差距的缩小。在许多方面,建立中国-东盟自由区是能够共同参与过程的一个挑战。关键词：东盟；中国；贸易信息技术的革命和全球化起到对人类生活状况的改变。在这种变化的过程中,经常会出现分歧和差距。特别是在经济发达的国家或地区发展信息技术革命和全球化更有很可能加剧这个差距。因此世界可能被分成一个越来越繁荣的部分和一个与之相反的部分。在稳定性方面的国际社会，这种拉大贫富差距的方法是不可取

3、的。对于东南亚国家联盟(东盟)而言,包含了差距不断扩大的新老成员国，其存在的问题也越来越严重。对中国来说,沿海内陆省份之间差距的不断拉大也严重威胁着国内的稳定。随着信息技术革命和全球化的发展，人员、商品、资金和信息在生产和服务上变得越来越重要，也出现了前所未有的规模经济。但增强的开放性也暴露出了漏洞。随着冷战的结束,前苏联联盟的崩溃，中国作为一个大国，、在1997 -1998年的亚洲金融危机中的重要作用。中国的亚洲邻国在一直监视中国并且仔细研究中国在对全球化及进入世界贸易组织(WTO)所采取的方法。在亚洲金融危机中，中国经济还在不间断地增长，这对其加入世贸组织有着强烈的吸引力。东盟保持其选择的

4、开放性，而为“东盟+ 3”框架提供了动力,几个有前途的项目在中国东盟自由贸易区进展的比预期要好,但这个框架不能取代东盟，对此东盟国家有着牢固的共识,或者应该包括在亚太的其他国家,尤其是美国。后者的存在一直被视为东盟发展的一个重要的基石，也保证了东亚地区的安全。日本和韩国在东北亚,泰国和菲律宾在东南亚,都与美国有着防御同盟的盟友关系。美国也将继续在亚太扮演重要的角色。显然有相当多的国家怨恨美国的霸权主义和单边主义,但很少会国家想要离开美国庇佑。近年来亚洲的人们普遍认为,日本的长期经济强国的地位已经让位于中国。1997年和2001年间,中国电脑和电子设备制造商销售到东南亚的产品增加了一倍多,而日本

5、销售的类似产品在该地区则下降了24%。1985年美国的贸易财政赤字，日本占了37以上,而在2002年，比例下降到不足15%，在同一时期,中国则占了超过21%的美国贸易财政赤字。1985年中国对美国的贸易顺差,仅为600万美元,在短短的十几年间，就转变成了830亿美元。中国出口顺差在美国产生了很小的政治摩擦,形成鲜明对比的是80年代“排日”风潮的。例如在2002年11月美国中期选举中国的缺席作为了一个热点问题。一些银行家注意到,中国和美国的生产链已经在东亚形成，并且中国支持美元。中国和日本都热衷于追求大国地位来提高他们的国际影响力,但在亚太地区两者都是支持多极化和不寻求主导的角色，是互补共享一个

6、公共利益的，进而在促进地区的稳定与繁荣。不幸的是, 近年来中国与日本一直在相互不信任，这也加剧台湾问题,历史遗产，及有关第二次世界大战的问题都悬而未决。与此同时, 中国和日本两国之间的竞争可能会在未来几年持续恶化。近年来，日本已经是一个政治和军事力量强大的国家。而中国的经济和军事实力也在持续发展中。一个强大的中国如何与一个强大的日本共同生存对从未经历过的两个现代历史的国家提出了一个严重的问题。在中美关系发生严重的挫折的时候,日本将被迫处在尴尬的位置,他们不得不去在美国和中国之间做出选择。因此布什政府执政的前几个月对中国特别的关注。在一个较低的水平, 在北京去世的老年一代政治领导人与东京的日本专

7、家或中国专家之间减少了相互同情和理解。在同一周当东盟和中国签署了协议来创建他们之间的一个自由贸易区,日本同样用“东盟+ 3”峰会的机会使日本也成为东盟的全面经济伙伴关系。尽管日本首相小泉纯一郎首相否认它,但是大多数观察家认为联合声明作为一个法案与中国竞争东南亚，与此同时，他们也仍怀疑它是否将切实执行。它十分重要,虽然双方承诺在未来十年将加强贸易和投资合作,该联合声明并未涵盖农业产品，并认为在日本的经济停滞和它的贸易保护主义可能会妨碍协议的实现。当天的东盟日本联合声明表示,印度还同意建立一个与东盟自由贸易区的第一次首脑会议中与区域组织。在1995年印度成为正式与东盟对话伙伴,但它并没有参与区域经

8、济一体化。柬埔寨首相洪森认为与印度的贸易和投资关系特别帮助与贫穷的东盟成员国之间的联系,因为他担心的出现双重东盟。韩国当然有点慢,不过认为这是讨论一个类似的自由贸易协定与东盟在峰会的过程,并且承认海洋和农产品的进口问题也来自东南亚的威胁。与此同时,马来西亚反对派仍然反对澳大利亚参与东盟的。尽管新加坡未能支持澳大利亚会员资格,但它仍然可以使东盟同意考虑建议一个与澳大利亚的单独峰会。全球化提供了一个有用的分析工具的概念，并且增进了跨国经济、政治、社会和文化的互动。虽然它一直稳步地打破着时间和地理的障碍,并在此过程中增强了互联性或相互依赖,但它也加剧了相互之间的贸易漏洞。亚太地区的漏洞是由全球化的后

9、果造成的，尤其是在1997 -1998爆发的金融危机。稳定和繁荣的亚洲经济受到威胁,并且在该地区的许多政权基于经济的发展而严重动摇了。东盟国家认为在亚洲金融危机期间美国和亚太经合组织没有帮助亚洲,而且他们发现国际货币基金组织附加条件十分苛刻。事实上马来西亚对国际货币基金组织的建议采取了相反的措施。它选择在其内部放松财政问题,保护屏障后面, 不可否认在很大程度上,它成功了。然而, 由于亚洲金融危机，东盟作为一个地区组织已经被大大削弱了,但它一直在努力重振其影响，“东盟+ 3”的方法一直被视为其一个重要的手段,目的就是重建和加强东盟的地位和相关性。在金融危机中，中国的经济表现是基于它最近加入了世贸

10、组织，北京与东盟成立的东盟-中国自由贸易区增加了 “东盟+ 3”组织。然而东盟仍然保持其选择的开放性,和它的限制自由贸易区的问题。中国并没有积极参与西部之间的竞争新自由主义模型和在亚太经合组织的东亚国家一起参与模型,但中国一直关心着不断危险恶化的中美关系，这也增加了东京和北京之间的不信任。因此在中国的重要性区域的政策使中国与东盟的关系不断增加；加强相互利益和相互依存显然是削弱东盟国家的所认为的中国威胁论的最好方式。但中国不应忽视日本的利益和韩国与中国-东盟自由贸易区的关系。对中国和许多东盟国家,经济发展仍是其最重要的来源,也是政府的第一要务。就像中国-东盟这个自由贸易区不仅仅体现在经济增长上必

11、须进行交付,而且希望它还应该促进地区差距的缩小，使中国与东盟各成员国的经济更发达和发展, 尤其是在中国比较富裕的沿海省份和贫穷的内陆省份。经济合作会不可避免的产生领土争端,与毒品有关的犯罪等跨国问题的出现。该协议建立在中国与东盟自由贸易区使两者实现唇齿相依。从长期来看,发展可能产生新的国内联盟和区域联盟需要更强大的区域经济合作组织的支持。原文：The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area: genesisand implicationsAustralian Journal of International Affairs, June 2004 Joseph Yu-shek C

12、hengAbstract:The Asia-Pacic regions vulnerabilities to the consequences of globalization were vividly revealed by its nancial crisis in 199798. ASEAN states considered the US and APEC less than helpful during the crisis, and they found the conditionalities imposed by the IMF unpalatable. But ASEAN a

13、s a regional organization has been much weakened, and it has been working hard to revive its inuence. The ASEAN plus 3 approach has been perceived as an important means to strengthen ASEANs status and relevance. The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area is undoubtedly an outstanding achievement of this approa

14、ch; but ASEAN has been trying to keep its options open. the other hand, China has been concerned with the danger of a deterioration in Sino-American relations and the increasing distrust between Tokyo and Beijing. Improvement of China-ASEAN relations therefore assumes increasing signicance in Chinas

15、 regional policy; and enhancing mutual interests and interdependence is the best way to erode the ASEAN states perception of the China threat. But China must not neglect the interests of Japan and South Korea or underestimate ASEANs resistance to the exclusion of the US and its desire to maintain a

16、balance of power in the region. The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area, hopefully, should also facilitate the narrowing of the gap between the more developed and the developing ASEAN members. In many ways, the establishment of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area represents a challenge to what can be achieved i

17、n the mutual engagement process.Key words: ASEAN; china; tradeThe revolutions in information technology and globalization have exerted much pressure on human life to change or to cope with the changes. In the process of such changes, divides and gaps often emerge. The information technology revoluti

18、on and globalization may well exacerbate the gaps in economic development between countries and regions. As a result, the world is in danger of being divided into a part that is becoming more and more prosperous and a part that is not. This widening gap between the rich and poor is not desirable in

19、terms of the stability of the international community. For the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), containing the expanding gaps between the old and new member states and narrowing the various gaps that exist are becoming serious issues. For China, the widening disparities between the co

20、astal provinces and the interior provinces represent a signicant threat to domestic stability. As the information technology revolution and globalization facilitate the movements of people, goods, money and information to an unprecedented degree, the economy of scale in the production and trade of g

21、oods and services becomes increasingly important. The enhanced openness also exposes the vulnerabilities of democratic societies to international terrorism. In the ongoing processes of changes and adjustments in East and Southeast Asia, By the end of the Cold War, the consequent collapse of the form

22、er Soviet Union, the emergence of China as a major power and the Asian nancial crisis in 19971998 is important variables. Chinas regional neighbors in general have been monitoring Chinas approach to globalization and its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) carefully. Chinas uninterrupted e

23、conomic growths in the wake of the Asian nancial crisis and its entry into the WTO have enhanced its attraction as a market for the ASEAN states. While the ASEAN plus 3 framework has provided momentum to several promising initiatives in the region and the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area has progressed b

24、etter than expected, the ASEAN states share a strong consensus that this framework must not replace ASEAN, nor should it be seen as excluding other countries in the Asia-Pacic, particularly the US. The latters presence has been seen as an important foundation stone and guarantor of regional security

25、. Japan and South Korea in Northeast Asia, as well as Thailand and the Philippines in Southeast Asia, have defence alliances with the US. It has been and continues to be a major investor too. Obviously there is considerable resentment against US hegemony and unilateralism, but very few in Southeast

26、Asia anticipate and desire the departure of the US. In recent years, Japans long-standing position as the economic powerhouse of Asia is widely seen to have been usurped by China. Between 1997 and 2001, Chinese computer and electrical equipment manufacturers more than doubled their sales to Southeas

27、t Asia, while Japanese sales of similar products to the region declined 24%. In 1985, Japan accounted for over 37% of the USs trade decit, and the proportion dropped to less than 15% in the rst eight months of 2002. In the same period, China accounted for more than 21% of the USs trade decit; its tr

28、ade surplus with the US was only US$6 million in 1985, and it exploded to US$83 billion in 2001. Chinas export surplus, however, has generated remarkably little political friction in the US, in contrast to theJapan-bashing of the 1980s. For example, China was conspicuously absent as an issue in the

29、US mid-term elections in November 2002. Some bankers observe that the Chinese and US production chains have increasingly been integrated in eastern Asia, and that the Chinese support the US dollar. China and Japan are keen to pursue the status of major powers to enhance their inuence in internationa

30、l affairs, but they are both in support of multipolarity and do not seek a predominant role in the Asia-Pacic region to the exclusion of the other. The two economies are complementary and they share a common interest in promoting regional stability and prosperity. Unfortunately, mutual distrust has

31、been increasing in recent years, and it has been exacerbated by the Taiwan issue and the failure to resolve the historical legacy relating to World War II. Meanwhile, competition between China and Japan may deteriorate in the years to come. Japan is already a political power with formidable military

32、 strength. Chinas economy and military capabilities will continue to develop. How a powerful China lives with a powerful Japan poses a question never experienced by the two countries in their modern history. In the event of a serious setback in Sino-American relations, Japan will then be forced into

33、 the awkward position of having to choose between the US and China. Hence, the Bush administrations pressures on China in its early months caused some concern in Southeast Asia. At a lower level, the passing away of the elderly generation of political leaders in Beijing and Tokyo as well as their re

34、spective Japan experts and China experts has reduced mutual empathy and understanding. In the same week when ASEAN and China signed the agreement to create a free trade area between them, Japan also made use of the ASEAN plus 3summit occasion to issue an ASEAN-Japan Joint Declaration on Comprehensiv

35、e Economic Partnership. Although the Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro denied it, most observers perceived the joint declaration as an act of competition with China for Southeast Asia, and they also doubted whether it would be implemented faithfully. It is signicant that while the two partie

36、s pledged to strengthen cooperation in trade and investment in the coming decade, the joint declaration did not cover agricultural products; and it is considered that economic stagnation in Japan and its trade protectionism may hamper the implementation of the agreement.On the same day of the ASEAN-

37、Japan joint declaration, India also agreed to establish a free trade area with ASEAN during its rst summit with the regional organisation. India became a full dialogue partner with ASEAN in 1995, but it had not been involved in the regional economic integration efforts before. Cambodian Prime Minist

38、er Hun Sen believed that trade and investment ties with India would especially help the newer and poorer members of ASEAN, as he was concerned with the emergence of a two-tier ASEAN South Korea was certainly a bit slow, though it was discussing a similar free trade pact with ASEAN during the summit

39、process, and it acknowledged that imports of marine and agricultural products from Southeast Asia posed a problem. Meanwhile, Malaysian opposition continues to be a hurdle to Australian participation in ASEAN. Though Singapore failed in its endorsement of Australian membership, it was able to make A

40、SEAN agree to consider a separate summit with Australia. Globalization provides a useful conceptual and analytical tool in the context of the progressive intensication of transnational economic, political, social and cultural interactions. While it has been steadily breaking down temporal and geogra

41、phic barriers, and in the process enhances interconnectedness or interdependence, it has also been exacerbating mutual vulnerabilities. The Asia-Pacic regions vulnerabilities to the consequences of globalization werevividly revealed by its nancial crisis in 19971998. The stability and prosperity con

42、stituting the Asian economic miracle were threatened, and the legitimacy of many regimes in the region based on economic development was severely shaken. ASEAN states considered the US and APEC less than helpful and sympathetic during the Asian nancial crisis, and they found the conditionalities imp

43、osed by the IMF unpalatable. Malaysia in fact adopted measures contrary to the recommendations from the IMF. It chose to unwind its nancial problems internally, behind protective barriers; and to a large extent, it succeeded. There is no denial, however, that ASEAN as a regional organisation has bee

44、n much weakened as a result of the Asian nancial crisis, and it has been working hard to revive its inuence. The ASEAN plus 3 approach has been perceived as an important means to re-establish and strengthen ASEANs status and relevance. Chinas economic performance in the wake of the nancial crisis, i

45、ts recent membership of the WTO, and Beijings eagerness to cultivate ASEAN have resulted in the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area being an outstanding achievement of the ASEAN plus 3 approach. ASEAN, however, has been sophisticated enough to keep its options open, and it appreciates the limitations of the

46、 free trade area as well as the formidable problems of implementing it. China did not play an active part in the competition between the Western neo-liberal model and the East-Asian state-involved model within APEC, but it has been concerned with the danger of a deterioration in Sino-American relati

47、ons and the increasing distrust between Tokyo and Beijing. Improvement of China-ASEAN relations therefore assumes increasing signicance in Chinas regional policy; and enhancing mutual interests and interdependence is obviously the best way to erode the ASEAN states perception of the China threat. Bu

48、t China must not neglect the interests of Japan and South Korea, The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area: genesis and implications 275 and underestimate ASEANs resistance to the exclusion of the US and its desire to maintain a balance of power in the region. For China and many ASEAN members, economic develo

49、pment remains themost important source of legitimacy for the governments and ruling elites. The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area therefore has to deliver not only in terms of economic growth but, hopefully, it should also facilitate the narrowing of the gap between the more developed and the developing ASEAN members, as wellas that between the more prosperous coastal provinces and the poor interior provinces in China. Economic cooperation is expected to generate