关于组织应收账款管理战略方针：一些经验证据[文献翻译].doc

1、原文：A Strategic Approach on Organizing Accounts Receivable Management: Some Empirical Evidence1. Introduction Firms rarely require immediate payment for their merchandise. For example, in the UK corporate sector more than 80% of daily business transactions are on credit terms and accounts receivable

2、constitute one of the main assets on corporate balance sheets (35% of total assets) As soon as trade debtors settle their accounts, cash flows into the company. At the same time, however, new sales generate new accounts receivable. The level of debtors thus remains constant when sales figures are st

3、able, while it grows as sales figures increase. Although firms extending trade credit heavily invest in accounts receivable, the resulting financial need is not the only reason why trade credit decisions merit more careful attention. This paper develops and discusses two additional considerations. F

4、irst, firms selling on credit open themselves to moral hazard. When exchange relations are subject to imperfect information, this uncertainty results in transaction costs. Sellers thus have incentives to develop organizational structures that reduce the transaction costs resulting from this asymmetr

5、ic information problem. Both homemade planning and sales structuring as well as balanced product and market portfolios can reduce this uncertainty, while externalization of risk becomes attractive when these homemade institutions fail. Second, vendors offering trade credit have to adopt a variety of

6、 new responsibilities: the decision whether or not to grant credit to a (new) customer, the assumption of credit-,administration- and collection-policies and the bearing of the credit risk involved. From a managerial point of view this means that the seller 1) finances the buyers inventory, 2) engag

7、es in additional accounting and collecting activities, 3) monitors the financial health of both existing and potential customers and 4) gets involved in assessing and bearing new risks. Not all credit management functions, however, have to be performed by the seller. Indeed, when extending trade cre

8、dit is thought to add no real value to the firm, its management can be contracted to a third party. A selling firms decision to extend trade credit thus also requires the seller to decide whether or not to integrate into managing accounts receivable. Moreover, when the seller decides to enter a mark

9、et transaction, several organizational structures can be employed. In their paper, Mian and Smith (1992) examine the relationship between the functions to be performed in the credit-administration process and the decision whether or not to subcontract these functions to a third party specialist. In

10、this paper, however, the extension of trade credit is looked upon from both a more strategic and a risk-oriented point of view. The strategic approach is based on the extensive financial management literature claiming that the extension of trade credit can become advantageous to the supplier, in whi

11、ch there will be a need for flexibility in managing accounts receivable. The risk-oriented point of view, on the other hand, is based upon those principles that deal with the moral hazard problem. Finally, the implications of these motivational theories are linked to the industrial organization lite

12、rature on vertical integration. Three types of outsourcing are considered. At first, the factoring contract has been chosen to operationalize the externalization of accounts receivable management, since factoring is the most comprehensive type of outsourcing a firms accounts receivable management. N

13、ext, we clearly isolate the decision to subcontract the administration process from the decision to subcontract the risks incurred, assuming that they are based on different decision processes with different decision variables. Indeed, we assume that both cost advantages and a need for flexibility i

14、n managing accounts receivable will cause integration of the firms credit administration. The assumption of credit risk, however, will not be delegated to a third party when the transaction can be performed in a stable and predictable environmental setting (inducing a low need for monitoring and con

15、trol).2. The Nature of Outsourcing Contracts Before analyzing policy choices and their respective determinants, we first give a description of the basic governance structures studied. 2.1. FACTORING AND ITS EQUIVALENTFactoring basically offers three types of services: 1) finance, 2) risk control and

16、 3) sales ledger administration. However, not all factoring contracts provide this full array of services. Based upon the scope of his managerial needs the seller can decide on the extensiveness of the contract. The most important distinction between factoring contracts is that between recourse and

17、non-recourse agreements. A non-recourse agreement implies that the factor makes the credit-extension decision, monitors and collects the accounts receivable and bears the credit risk. Under a recourse agreement the firm selling on credit retains the risk of non-recovery of the debt. Moreover, when t

18、he contract provides financing, the factoring contract is called an advance-factoring contract. A full-factoring agreement then is a non-recourse agreement, providing financing for all credit sales (both national sales and export). The equivalents internalizing their accounts receivable management f

19、inance their accounts receivable out of general corporate credit and manage internally the credit-risk assessment, credit-granting, credit-collection and credit-risk bearing functions. 2.2. THE ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT CONTRACTThe companies using an administrative management contract are defined as

20、 those companies that use credit information agencies to assess the trade credit risks, to collect accounts receivable when they are due or ARF (Accounts Receivable Financing)-contracts and service contracts offered by a factor. Thus, although the administration of accounts receivable has been outso

21、urced, the firm still bears the trade credit risk.2.3. THE RISK MANAGEMENT CONTRACT The risk management contract is defined as a contract that indemnifies firms against losses on uncollected accounts receivable but does not take care of the firms credit administration process. Examples of such third

22、 party specialists are e.g. credit insurance contracts and partial factoring agreements. 3.Determinants of Alternate Policies The factoring contract has been chosen to operationalize the full externalization of accounts receivable management. Next, we assume that the decision to outsource this manag

23、ement is inuenced by the need for exibility in extending trade credit and collecting payments on the one hand and the existence of economies of scale and scope reducing the unit cost of management on the other. Further, such a need for exibility and control is assumed to be induced by the existence

24、of real motives for extending trade credit. Indeed, when these motives hold, trade credit contributes to the process of maximizing shareholder wealth, a traditional objective in nancial management literature, and becomes a strategic asset that is not likely to be extended to a third party. Next, the

25、 effects of uncertainty and bounded rationality in managing accounts receivable are studied, assuming that the suppliers risk increases as a result of uncertainty in the customers payment behavior and uncertainty in the suppliers business environment. The less predict-able the customers payment beha

26、vior, the higher the uncertainty in the suppliers nancial needs, all other things being equal. Therefore, the assumption of the credit risk becomes less attractive whenever the customers payment behavior is hard to predict. In addition, two types of environmental uncertainty have been withheld: the

27、possibility to control the customers payment behavior (based on the absence of information-asymmetry) and the possibility to spread the risks incurred. Therefore, trade credit administration is described as the process of monitoring and collecting the outstanding accounts receivable. Moreover, since

28、 one cannot bear the consequences of decisions controlled by a third party, it is reasonable to assume that rms deciding to internalize the collection of their accounts receivable will also internalize the credit granting decision. The risk assumption includes the assumption of all responsibilities

29、in case of late and/or bad payments.3.1 THE DSO-RATE Since in the traditional literature on accounts receivable management the average number of days sales outstanding (DSO) is often mentioned to be the primary reason for outsourcing, the DSO rate has been withheld for further analysis. Indeed, the

30、pure financial theories on trade credit stress the fact that high DSO-rates increase the suppliers financial needs, increasing the likelihood of outsourcing. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that when the firm has no accounts receivable (although it provides its customers with the opportunity to

31、 delay their payments), there wont be any need for outsourcing its management. This results in the following hypothesis: Firms with a higher average number of days sales outstanding are more likely to outsource their accounts receivable management. 3.2. COST ADVANTAGES Economies of scale and scope a

32、re expected to affect the outsourcing decision. Indeed, the xed costs associated with credit-risk assessment and monitoring and collection policies can be spread over a larger number of accounts as credit sales increase. Firms with higher credit sales are therefore expected to invest in more special

33、ized personnel, techniques and knowledge, enabling them to realize learning-effects. 3.3.NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY AND CONTROL: THE INCENTIVES FOR TRADE CREDIT EXTENSION The more recent developments in accounts receivable management literature (e.g. Emery, 1988; Brick and Fung, 1984; Schwartz, 1974) all

34、emphasize its potential strategic value which is usually translated into a set of motives causing trade credit extension. Among these we discern a pricing motive, an operating motive, a nanc-ing and a tax-based motive and a transaction motive. In what follows, each of them is briey discussed and tra

35、nslated into testable hypotheses. 3.3.1. The Pricing Motive The pricing motive is extensively described in Schwartz and Whitcomb (1978, 1979) and is based on the idea that both market structures and legal arrangements often restrict a rms protability by constraining price competition in the market.

36、In such circumstances trade credit not only becomes an effective tool in creating hidden price-cuts; it can also be used to practice sub-rosa price discrimination (by extending different credit terms to different customers). This price-setting objective results in the following hypothesis: Suppliers

37、 who use trade credit as a price setting variable are less likely to outsource their accounts receivable management. 3.3.2. The Operating Motive In addition, the operating motive for the extension of trade credit assumes that rms with higher inventory storage costs can transfer these costs onto the

38、buyer by extending trade credit. That way trade credit offers the opportunity to split up the inventory cost into an operational storage cost to be borne by the buyer and a nancial opportunity cost induced by the payment delay offered by the seller. Therefore, Firms, in particular those with seasona

39、l sales gures, can have a strategic advantage in extending trade credit. This strategic potential, however, increases even more whenever the customer has a comparative advantage in storing the delivered goods, which is more likely to occur when he transforms these into nished, non-perishable product

40、s. This results in the following hypothesis: Suppliers of semi-nished products with seasonal sales gures are less likely to outsource their accounts receivable management. 3.3.3. The Financial Motive The nance-based models for the extension of trade credit as developed by Emery (1984, 1987, 1988), S

41、chwartz (1974) and Chant and Walker (1988) argue that rms with ready access to additional nancing will extend trade credit to rms facing higher nancing costs or restricted nancing options. That way, the stronger and more liquid selling companies can help nance the growth of their smaller and more vu

42、lnerable customers, thereby enlarging and safeguarding their own future markets. Since these rms have incentives to act as a banker, they will be less inclined to outsource their control in managing accounts receivable. This results in the following hypothesis: The more liquid suppliers are less lik

43、ely to outsource their accounts receivable management. 3.3.4. The Tax-based Motive Even in perfectly competitive nancial markets with homogeneous interest rates, trade credit can act as a redistributor of wealth since high tax paying suppliers have a lower after-tax nancing cost. That way, the tax-b

44、ased models as introduced by Brick and Fung (1984a, 1984b) see trade credit as a redistributor of tax advantages between buyer and seller. They nally conclude that “ sellers with high effective tax rates will supply more trade credit and are therefore more likely to have a longer investment in accou

45、nts receivable”. Frank and Maksimovic (1995) follow this reasoning stating that the higher the suppliers tax rate, the higher his comparative tax advantage will be and the more willing he will be to invest in trade credit. His lower after-tax nancing cost induces the same incentives as discussed und

46、er the nancing motive, resulting in the hypothesis that: Suppliers who are in a higher tax-bracket are less likely to outsource their accounts receivable management. Source: Greet Asselbergh, A Strategic Approach on Organizing Accounts Receivable Management: Some Empirical Evidence. Journal of Manag

47、ement and Governance,1999(3):pp15-20译文：关于组织应收账款管理战略方针：一些经验证据1 简介企业很少需要为他们的商品立即付款。例如，在英国企业界超过80%的日常业务交易还在信用期限中，应收账款成为构成公司资产负债表（总资产的35%）的主要资产之一。当有应收账款回收入公司的账户，形成现金流量流入公司，与此同时，又有新的销售产生新的应收账款。对债务人来说，当它的销售额增长债务水平却保持不变。虽然公司扩大贸易信贷、大量投资在应收帐款所造成的财政需要的不是唯一的原因，但贸易信贷决策更需要仔细注意。本文研究和讨论了两个额外问题。首先是企业对赊销开发自己的道德风险承受能

48、力。当交易关系受到不完全信息的影响，这种不确定性造成了交易成本。卖方因此鼓励发展组织结构产生的成本，降低了这个信息不对称的问题。这两种自制规划和销售结构平衡的产品和市场的投资组合可以减少上述的不确定性,而风险外化使得这种不确定性风险开始导致这些自制的机构失败。第二，供应商在提供贸易信贷时会采用一系统新职能：在决定是否将贸易信贷提供给一个新的信贷客户，这涉及到信贷的管理和收集，信用政策以及信贷风险的承担。从管理的角度这意味着卖方必须做到1）了解买方的库存；2）从事额外的会计和收集活动；3）监督现有和潜在客户的财务状况；4）评估和承受新的信贷风险。但是并不是所有的信用管理职能都必须由卖方进行。事实

49、上，当扩大贸易信贷被认为没有给公司带来真正的价值时，贸易信贷可以承包给第三方执行。一个销售公司决定要扩大贸易信贷也要求卖方来决定是否融入应收账款管理。此外，当卖方决定进入市场交易时一些组织结构可以被采用。在米安和史密斯（1992）的论文中研究了必须在信贷管理过程中执行的职能，并决定是否将这些职能转包给第三方专家的关系。在本文中，扩展商业信用是更具战略性和风险导向性的观点。战略手段是基于广泛的财务管理文献，它们声称扩大贸易信贷对供应商有利，但其中需要有灵活的应收账款管理。另一方面，风险导向性则是基于这些原则处理道德风险问题。最后，这些激励理论联系在一起组成了垂直整合产业组织。有三种类型的外包会被考虑到。首先，由于保理业务是外包公司应收账款管理中最全面的类型，保理合同被选定为实施应收账款账户管理的具体化方式。接下来，我们清楚地区分决定转包分包所产生的风险管理过程，假设它们是以不同的决策变量和不同的决策过程为基础。事实上，我